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The purpose of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), adopted mandatorily by European listed
firms in 2005, is to increase the transparency and the comparability of accounting information, which should
have led to improvements in these firms’ information environment. This study uses market microstructure
proxies for information asymmetry to examine the effects of IFRS adoption on the level of information
asymmetry in the Spanish stock market. Therefore, we consider a setting with substantial differences between
local standards – Spanish Accounting Standards (SAS) – and IFRS and where the level of enforcement is
low. By controlling for conventional determinants of information asymmetry and firms’ characteristics that
influence their information environment, we find a reduction of information asymmetry after IFRS adoption.
Our findings suggest that the mandatory switch from local accounting standards to IFRS conveys benefits to
the market, even when the enforcement level is not strong.
In this paper we investigate the relation betweenthe mandatory adoption of International FinancialReporting Standards (IFRS) and information
asymmetry in the equity market, using direct measures
of information asymmetry derived from themicrostruc-
ture literature. The adoption of IFRS around the world
has been one of the most important regulatory changes
in financial reporting in many years. In particular,
European Union (EU) Regulation No. 1606/2002
requires listed companies to prepare their consoli-
dated financial statements according to IFRS as of 1
January 2005. The purpose of this regulatory change
is to improve the comparability and transparency
of accounting information (European Communities
2002). This should have led to financial statements of
higher informational quality for market participants
and potential beneficial economic consequences on the
market. As a result, the switch to IFRS has generated
extensive empirical literature about its economic
consequences on financial reporting quality and capital
markets in general.1 Most of the previous empirical
literature examining the market consequences of IFRS
adoption has found positive market effects in terms
of liquidity and the cost of capital (Daske et al. 2008,
2013; Li 2010; Christensen et al. 2013), and also, by
examining its effects on analyst forecast accuracy and
consensus on the information environment (Tan et al.
2011; Byard et al. 2011; Horton et al. 2013). This
empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that
higher accounting information quality and increased
disclosure derived from IFRS adoption (Barth et al.
2008) should achieve one of the main objectives of
standard setters, which is to increase investor confidence
through the reduction of information asymmetry.
Theoretical and empirical research shows that in-
creased financial reporting transparency and disclosure
reduce information asymmetry between investors by
decreasing private information search incentives and by
lowering the amount of private information compared
to publicly available information (Diamond 1985;
Diamond and Verrechia 1991; Easley and O’Hara 2004).
Lower levels of information asymmetry benefit investors
because they lead tomore-informed valuation, so reduc-
ing adverse selection risk and, hence, increasing market
liquidity (e.g. Glosten andMilgron 1985). Consequently,
information asymmetry proxies should reflect, among
other things, firms’ accounting quality (Leuz 2003).
Therefore, if IFRS adoption really implies an increase
in financial reporting quality or disclosure, and/or
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enhances financial information comparability, so,
according to economic theory, the market benefits
after IFRS adoption can be attributed to the change in
accounting standards.However, in the recent accounting
literature there is an ongoing debate about whether
the post-IFRS market benefits have been driven by the
change in the accounting standards per se or by other re-
lated factors that include: a) institutional factors such as
the level of the enforcement of the country and the extent
of enforcement changes made to support the implemen-
tation of IFRS; b) firms’ reporting incentives; and c) the
degree of similarity between IFRS and preceding local
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
Most previous studies argue that, at the national level,
post-IFRS liquidity benefits appear in countries with
high enforcement or with concurrent changes in report-
ing enforcement, or, at the firm level, they depend on
firm’s reporting incentives. In particular, Daske et al.
(2008) and Li (2010) find that capital market bene-
fits occur in countries with strong legal enforcement
mechanisms and where firms have more incentives to
be transparent. Considering firm level heterogeneity in
examining the economic consequences around Interna-
tional Accounting Standards (IAS) and IFRS adoptions,
Daske et al. (2013) conclude that reductions in the cost of
capital and increases in liquidity are found in those firms
with higher changes in their reporting incentives, that is,
in those that increase their commitment to transparency
after IAS/IFRS adoptions. Christensen et al. (2013) try to
disentangle the effects of switching to IFRS from those
motivated by concurrent changes in enforcement, and
find that the liquidity increase is concentrated in those
EU countries that improved their reporting enforce-
ment. Thus, they conclude that the liquidity benefits
observed around IFRS adoption are driven basically by
the changes in enforcementmore than by the accounting
standards changes themselves. Barth and Israeli (2013),
in contrast, believe that the Christensen et al. (2013)
findings suggest that it is the combination of changes in
accounting standards to IFRS and advances in enforce-
ment that convey liquidity benefits.
Regarding the influence of the degree of similarity be-
tween IFRS and preceding local GAAP, the evidence is
not conclusive. Several studies have found that the ex-
tent of the differences between prior domestic standards
and IFRS is positively associated with the increase in
analyst following (Tan et al. 2011) and analyst forecast
accuracy (Byard et al. 2011). In contrast, Brochet et al.
(2013) report that the adoptionof IFRS leads to informa-
tional benefits, even in a country whose domestic stan-
dards present few differences with IFRS, as is the United
Kingdom (UK).
To shed further light on the debate surrounding the
maindeterminants of themarket benefits following IFRS
adoption, we examine the IFRS effects on the level of in-
formation asymmetry in the Spanish Stock Exchange.2
Our study provides new evidence, that could be valuable
for at least two reasons. First, we analyse IFRS adoption
using market microstructure measures estimated from
high frequency data, that is, the bid-ask spread, the illiq-
uidity measure developed in Amihud (2002), the price
impact introduced by Huang and Stoll (1996), the Prob-
ability of Informed Trading (PIN) of Easley et al. (1996),
the Volume-synchronised Probability of Informed Trad-
ing (VPIN) of Easley et al. (2012), and an index of in-
formation asymmetry as the first principal component
of the five former measures. Bid-ask spread is a com-
monly used proxy for information asymmetry because
it compensates liquidity providers for transacting with
better-informed traders and it increases with the degree
of information asymmetry. The measures that capture
price impact of transactions – the illiquidity measure
of Amihud (2002) and the price impact of Huang and
Stoll (1996) – appear to be important in describing the
arrival of new information to market participants. The
well-known measures of PIN and the novel VPIN di-
rectly infer the presence of privately informed traders in
the market from the computation of order imbalances
between buys and sells. As well as testing these measures
individually, we construct an index of adverse selection
from this set of market microstructure measures, which
allows us to extract the common variation in all these
information asymmetry measures and, in this way, we
minimise the possibility that these proxies are driven by
other factors different from adverse selection, that is, in-
ventory costs, transactions costs, and so on. Second, we
focus on the Spanish market, which can be considered
a suitable setting for understanding the capital market
effects of IFRS adoption. As in all the other EU coun-
tries, the Spanish firms listed on secondary stockmarkets
have beenmandatorily required to prepare their consoli-
dated financial statements in accordance with IFRS since
2005. Spain is a country characterised by low enforce-
ment (La Porta et al. 1998; Kaufmann et al. 2009) and
high disparity between Spanish Accounting Standards
(SAS) and IFRS in terms of standards and disclosure
requirements (Bae et al. 2008; Nobes 2011). Therefore,
the chosen setting is appropriate for the analysis of the
consequences of the accounting change, since we avoid
selection bias of voluntary adopters (Ashbaugh 2001)
and we deal with a context without concurrent changes
in the legal environment and enforcement (Choi et al.
2013). Effectively, in Spain, the accounting changes and,
in particular, the increases in disclosure requirements
implied by IFRS are implemented without relevant con-
current enforcement changes. Hence, if we find a reduc-
tion in the level of information asymmetry after IFRS
adoption, this result supports the arguments that IFRS
confer information asymmetry benefits when the dis-
tance between local GAAP and IFRS is high, even though
the enforcement level is low and the reporting enforce-
ment changes around the adoption of IFRS are not
2 Australian Accounting Review C© 2016 CPA Australia
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important. This reduction of information asymmetry
could be driven by the relevant accounting change per
se, which enhances financial reporting transparency and
disclosure. On the contrary, a non-significant result
would be consistent with the view that IFRS adoption
by itself does not provide capital market benefits, at least
with regards to information asymmetry.
To conduct our analyses, we constructed a balanced
Q2
panelof Spanishnon-financialfirms for theperiod2001–
2008. By controlling for market determinants of infor-
mation asymmetry and firms’ characteristics, we find a
significant reduction in the level of information asym-
metry among investors in the Spanish Stock Exchange
after IFRS adoption. Overall, we find significant and
consistent decreases in five out of our six proxies for
information asymmetry, which means that IFRS had
an effect not only on liquidity, but also on the level
of information asymmetry among market participants.
After implementing several sensitivity analyses we con-
firm that this post-IFRS improvement in information
asymmetry is not simply due to time effects, and we
also find that the reduction in information asymmetry is
stronger in those firms with higher concentrated owner-
ship, which are usually characterised as less proactive to
disclose information. Overall, these findings suggest that
the higher disclosure and transparency requirements im-
plied by IFRS adoption have benefited the information
environment of Spanish firms.
Our study contributes to the literature by providing
new empirical evidence to the debate on the market
effects of IFRS by using measures of adverse selection
developed by market microstructure literature. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study that uses
measures such as PIN, VPIN, and a composite index of
adverse selection to examine the effects of IFRS adop-
tion on the levels of information asymmetry in the mar-
ket. Prior studies researching into the effects of IFRS
on the information environment have mainly focused
on proxies that can be considered as indirect measures
of information asymmetry, such as the accuracy of fi-
nancial analysts’ forecasts (e.g. Byard et al. 2011, Tan
et al. 2011), liquidity measures and the cost of capi-
tal (e.g. Daske et al. 2008, 2013; Li 2010; Christensen
et al. 2013). As Bharath et al. (2009) argue, the use of
an index of information asymmetry based on market
microstructure measures has more desirable properties
than using individual proxies proposed by the corpo-
rate finance literature (e.g. analyst coverage, dispersion
of analysts’ forecasts, tangibility of assets), because these
measures are often inconsistent, static, persistent, and
have multiple and ad hoc interpretations. In addition,
using the proxies individually allows us to examine the
channel through which IFRS affects information asym-
metry. Moreover, since IFRS adoptionmay be associated
with higher disclosure and financial reporting quality,
our results also extend previous literature on the market
effects of disclosure and accounting quality (Diamond
and Verrechia 1991; Easley and O’Hara 2004; Lambert
et al. 2007, 2012).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2
describes the measures of information asymmetry used.
Section 3 describes the research design, sample selection,
and data. Section 4 presents the descriptive statistics and
empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Measures of Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry is a key concept in capital mar-
kets because it affects stock liquidity (Kyle 1985), which
in turn has an effect on asset pricing and on the cost
of capital (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Easley
and O’Hara 2004). Empirically capturing the level of
information asymmetry in a firm’s market valuation is
a difficult task since information asymmetry is not di-
rectly observable. The market microstructure literature
has proposed different measures and procedures to cap-
ture financial market perceptions of adverse selection
risk, which arises when some traders possess private
information not currently reflected in stock prices. In
contrast to the measures introduced by corporate fi-
nance, market microstructure exploits several sources of
information contained in intraday data to capture the
presence of traders with better information (informed
traders). Nevertheless, in the literature there has always
been a debate about the appropriateness of each proxy
in measuring information-based trading. All measures
of information asymmetry are imperfect proxies for the
financial market’s perception of the adverse selection be-
tween informedanduninformed traders. For this reason,
to obtain a more accurate information asymmetry mea-
sure, prior studies (e.g. Bharath et al. 2009) use principal
component analysis to extract the first principal compo-
nent from individual proxies for information asymme-
try. In this paper, as well as testing the IFRS effect on five
individual proxies of information asymmetry developed
by market microstructure literature – bid-ask spread,
illiquidity measure, price impact, PIN, and VPIN – we
create an adverse selection index (denoted as ASY here-
after) applying principal component analysis to these
measures.
Bid-ask spread
The first and effortless proxy for asymmetric informa-
tion is the bid-ask spread, a widely used measure of
trading costs (liquidity). Bid-ask spread incorporates a
component related to the liquidity providers’ protec-
tion frombeing adversely selected. Glosten andMilgrom
(1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1992) theoretically show
that the sole presence of traders with different levels of
information is reason enough for the existence of the
C© 2016 CPA Australia Australian Accounting Review 3
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bid-ask spread. We estimate the relative quoted spread,
QSPD, which is defined as
QSPDt = at − bt
Qt
(1)
where at and bt correspond to the ask and the bid quotes
in t. Qt = (at+bt)/2 is the quoted midpoint in t, com-
monly used as a proxy for the efficient price. For each
asset, we calculate a yearly equally-weighted mean from
daily relative quoted spreads, which we compute as the
time-weighted average of relative quote spreads regis-
tered over a day.
Illiquidity measure
Since adverse selection is an important determinant of
stock liquidity, we estimate the index of illiquidity in-
troduced by Amihud (2002), which is a volume-based
liquidity indicator defined as
AMHt = 1
Dt
Dt∑
d=1
|Rdt |
Vdt
(2)
where Rd,t is the return on day d on year t, Vdt is the
volume in euros on day d on year t, and Dt is the num-
ber of days for which data are available in year t. This
illiquidity measure gives the average of the daily price
impact of the order flow or the absolute percentage price
change associated with a unit of trading volume. When
a stock is liquid, large trading volumes provoke small
price changes. Therefore, higher values of AMH indi-
cate higher price moves in response to trading volume,
and thus higher stock illiquidity. It is expected that the
greater the extent of information asymmetry, the worse
stock liquidity will be, and the greater AMH will be.3
We use the yearly mean of the daily AMH values, and
following Amihud (2002), we multiply AMH by 10.6
Price impact
The illiquidity index of Amihud (2002) provides a
rough measure of price impact. Trades initiated by
noise traders lead to transitory changes in transaction
prices, while information-based trades provoke perma-
nent price changes.Huang andStoll (1996) introduce the
realised spread (or price reversal) and the price impact
by considering the quote adjustment that takes place a
period of time after a trade to extract the presence of
new information. Price impact (PI) is the permanent
price change (or information content) of a trade and is
defined as
PIt+τ = (Qt+τ − Qt )Xt (3)
where Qt is the quote midpoint defined previously, Xt is
a trade indicator variable taking the value –1 if the trade
in t is initiated in the sell side and 1 if it is initiated in
the buy side. Finally, τ is the period of time for prices
to fully reflect the information content in trade t. We
use 1-, 5- and 30-minute periods to estimate PI.4 PI
is also computed in trade-time by averaging (volume-
weighted) all the trades within the day and, after that, by
averaging (equally-weighted) all the trading days within
theyear.A large andpositivePI indicates ahigh frequency
of information-based trades.
Probability of informed trading (PIN)
The PIN is the unconditional probability that a ran-
domly selected trade originates from an informed trader.
The PIN is a measure based on the theoretical work of
Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992), although the original
PIN model was introduced by Easley et al. (1996). The
PIN is not directly observable but is a function of the
theoretical parameters of a microstructure model that
have to be estimated by numerical maximisation of a
likelihood function. The PIN model considers trading
as a game between liquidity providers and traders (po-
sition takers) that is repeated over trading days. Trades
can come from informed or uninformed traders. For
any given trading day the arrival of buy and sell orders
from uninformed traders, who are not aware of the new
information, is modeled as two independent Poisson
processes with daily arrival rates εb and εS, respectively.
The model assumes that information events occur be-
tween trading days with probability α. Informed traders
only trade on days with information events, buying if
they have seen good news (with probability 1 – δ) and
selling if they have seen bad news (with probability δ).
The orders from the informed traders follow a Poisson
process with a daily arrival rate μ.
Under this model, the likelihood of observing B buys
and S sells on a single trading day is
L ((B , S)|θ) = (1 − α)e−εb (εb)
B
B !
e−εs
(εs)
S
S!
+ αδe−εb (εb)
B
B !
e−(εs+μ)
(εs + μ)S
S
+ α (1 − δ) e−(εb+μ) (εb + μ)
B
B !
e−εs
(εs)
S
S!
(4)
where B and S represent total buy trades and sell trades
for the day respectively, and θ = (α, δ, μ, εb, εs) is the
parameter vector. This likelihood function is amixture of
three Poisson probabilities, weighted by the probability
of having a ‘good news day’ α(1 − δ), a ‘bad news day’
αδ, and ‘no-news day’ (1−α). Assuming cross-trading
4 Australian Accounting Review C© 2016 CPA Australia
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day independence, the likelihood function across J days
is simply the product of the daily likelihood functions:
L (M|θ) =
∏J
j=1 L
(
θ|Bj , Sj
)
(5)
where Bj, and Sj are the numbers of buy and sell trades
for day j = 1, . . . , J, and M = [(B1, S1), . . . , (BJ, SJ)]
is the data set. Maximisation of (5) over θ given the
data M yields maximum likelihood estimates for the
underlying structural parameters of the model (α, δ, μ,
εb, εs). Once the parameters of interest are estimated, the
PIN is calculated as
PIN = αμ
αμ + εb + εs (6)
where αμ + εb+ εs is the arrival rate of all orders and
αμ is the arrival rate of informed orders. The PIN is
therefore the ratio of orders from informed traders to
the total number of orders.
An attractive feature of the PIN methodology is its
apparently modest data requirement. All that is neces-
sary to estimate the model is the number of buy- and
sell-initiated trades for each stock and each trading day.
However, one shortcoming of the methodology is that,
although the estimation procedure is straightforward,
it often encounters numerical problems when perform-
ing the estimation in practice. Especially in stocks with
a huge number of trades, the optimisation program
may clash with computational overflow or underflow
(floating-point exception) and, as a consequence, it may
not be able to obtain an optimal solution. These diffi-
culties in estimating PIN have been exacerbated in re-
cent years due to the steady increase in the number of
trades whichthat are a consequence, among other rea-
sons, of the growth in automated trading and structural
changes in the market, which have greatly reduced mar-
ket depth (Aslan et al. 2011). To estimate PIN we use the
computational-friendly likelihood function proposed by
Lin and Ke (2011) using Matlab software. To set initial
valueswe follow theprocessdescribed inGanet al. (2015)
that assists the maximum likelihood estimation process
both in terms of speed and accuracy.5. We finally use the
yearly mean of the monthly PIN estimates.6
Volume-synchronised probability of informed
trading (VPIN)
As an update of the PINmodel, Easley et al. (2012) have
developed a newmeasure for adverse selection risk called
Volume-synchronised Probability of Informed Trading
or VPIN. The VPIN approach has some practical ad-
vantages over the PIN methodology that make it partic-
ularly attractive for both practitioners and researchers.
The main advantage is that VPIN does not require the
estimation of non-observable parameters using optimi-
sation or numerical methods, thereby avoiding all the
associated computational problems and biases. In par-
ticular, VPIN measures order flow toxicity, which can
be considered as a broader concept for adverse selection
applied to the particular world of liquidity providers in
a high frequency trading (HFT) environment. Abad and
Yagu¨e (2012) show that VPIN can be considered as a
more flexible measure of asymmetric information that
can be applied in a wide range of frameworks by choos-
ing the appropriate values of the variables involved in the
estimation process. There are three relevant variables in
theVPIN approach: time bar, volume bucket and sample
length. Below, we briefly review the three levels in which
the VPIN calculation takes place (for a more accurate
description of the procedure, see the original paper of
Easley et al. 2012; for a numeric example of this proce-
dure, see Abad and Yagu¨e 2012).
1. Time bars The original procedure begins with trade
aggregation in time bars. Bar size is the first key vari-
able of the VPIN computation process. Easley et al.
(2012) initially use 1-minute time bars. In each time
bar, trades are aggregated by adding the volume of
all the trades in the bar (if any) and by computing
the price change for this period of time. Afterwards,
and in order to take into account trade size, the sam-
ple is ‘expanded’ by repeating each bar price change a
number of times equal to the number of shares traded
in the bar. Thus, the original raw sample becomes a
sample of one-unit trades, each associated with the
price change of the corresponding bar.
2. Volume buckets, bulk classification and order imbal-
ance Volume bucket is the second essential variable
in VPIN metrics. Volume buckets represent pieces
of homogeneous information content that are used
to compute order imbalances. In Easley et al. (2012)
volume bucket size (VBS) is calculated by dividing
the average daily volume (in shares) by 50, which is
the number of buckets they initially consider. There-
fore, if we depart from the average daily volume, it is
the number of buckets which fully determines VBS.
Consequently, we consider the number of buckets as
our second key variable. Buckets are filled by adding
the volume in consecutive time bars until completing
the VBS. If the volume of the last time bar needed
to complete a bucket is for a size greater than that
required, the excess size is given to the next bucket. In
general, a volume bucket needs a certain number of
time bars to be completed although it is also possible
that the volume in a time bar could be enough to fill
one (or more) volume buckets. At the same time as
bucket completion, time bar volume is classified as
buyer- or seller-initiated in probabilistic terms. Nor-
mal distribution is employed labelling as ‘buy’ the
volume that results from multiplying the volume bar
C© 2016 CPA Australia Australian Accounting Review 5
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by the value of the normal distribution evaluated in
the standardised price change Z(P/σP). To stan-
dardise, we divide the corresponding price change by
the standard deviation of all price changes for the
whole sample. Analogously, we categorise as ‘sell’ the
volume that results from multiplying the volume bar
by the complementary of the normal distribution for
the buy side, 1-Z(P/σP). Order imbalance (OI) is
then computed for each bucket simply by obtaining
the absolute value of the difference between buy vol-
ume and sell volume in the assigned time bars.
3. VPIN and sample length Finally, in the last step we ob-
tainVPIN values. To do this, it is necessary to define a
new variable: sample length (n). This variable estab-
lishes the number of the buckets with which VPIN is
computed. Following the link between PIN andVPIN
established in Easley et al. (2012),
VPIN = αμ
αμ + εb + εs ≈
E [VSellτ − VBuyτ ]
E [VSellτ + VBuyτ ]
=
n∑
τ=1
OIτ
n∗VBS
(7)
whereVPIN is simply the average of order imbalances in
the sample length, that is, the result of dividing the sum
of order imbalances for all the buckets in the sample
length (proxy of the expected trade imbalance) by the
product of volume bucket size (VBS) multiplied by the
sample length (n) (proxy for the expected total number
of trades). theVPINmetric is updated after each volume
bucket in a rolling-window process. For example, if the
sample length is 50, when bucket #51 is filled, we drop
bucket #1 andwe calculate the newVPINbased on buck-
ets #2 to #51. Easley et al. (2012) first consider sample
length equal to the number of buckets (50), but through-
out the paper the authors change this variable to 350 or
250 depending on what they want to analyse. A sample
length of 50 buckets when the number of buckets is also
50 is equivalent to obtaining a daily VPIN. A sample
length of 250 (350) when the number of buckets is 50 is
equivalent to obtaining a five-day (seven-day) VPIN. An
annual VPIN is computed by averaging the values of the
resultVPIN series for each year. In this study,VPIN series
are obtained using time bars of 1-minute. The volume
bucket size (VBS) corresponds to the daily average trad-
ing volume (in shares) for each year. The sample length
to obtain each VPIN observation is one volume bucket.
Information asymmetry index (ASY)
Finally, to isolate the common adverse selection com-
ponent underlying our market microstructure proxies,
we constructed an index of information asymmetry
(ASY) by employing principal components analysis.
After computing the five measures of information
asymmetry for each firm-year, the first (and only) factor
with an eigenvalue greater than one explains 62.93%
of the variance and each component of the asymmetry
factor enters with positive sign, leading to the following
index:
ASY = 0.510QDSP + 0.277AMH + 0.468PI
+ 0.467PIN + 0.474VPIN (8)
Therefore, each proxy for information asymmetry
plays its role in the index. A higher value of the index
means a higher level of adverse selection7.
Research Design, Sample, and Data
Model specification
We examine the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption
on the level of information asymmetry among market
participants. Specifically, we estimate the following re-
gression model:
ASYInf i,t = β0 + β1IFRS + β2Sizei,t + β3Turnoveri,t
+ β4Volati,t + β5L evi,t + β6Profi,t
+ β7BTMi,t + β8Owni,t + β9Analysi,t
+ β10Ibexi,t +
∑
j
βj Ind + ε (9)
where ASYInfi,t is one of our six proxies for information
asymmetry (QSPD, AMH, PI, PIN, VPIN and ASY) for
firm i in year t. IFRS is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 for the post adoption period (from 2005 to 2008)
and 0 otherwise (from 2001 to 2004). We expect β1<0 if
after IFRS adoption information asymmetry is reduced.
We include control variables according to the previous
market microstructure and accounting literature. Thus,
based on the extensive disclosure literature, it is expected
that more transparent firms will present lower levels of
information asymmetry. Following prior studies (e.g.
Easley et al. 1996), we include firm size, share turnover
and return variability, because the microstructure liter-
ature shows that larger, more frequently traded and less
volatile firms are more liquid and suffer lower informa-
tion asymmetry problems. Size is the natural logarithm
of total sales. Turnover is the natural logarithm of trad-
ing volume (measured as the average daily volume in
Euros) scaled by the market value of a firm’s equity to
facilitate cross-sectional comparison.Volat is a proxy for
stock return volatility calculated as the standard devi-
ation of daily returns. In addition, we control for firm
6 Australian Accounting Review C© 2016 CPA Australia
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Information asymmetry measures
#obs. Mean SD 10th percentile Median 90th percentile
QDSP 504 0.0072 0.0071 0.0013 0.0046 0.0165
AMH 504 0.3543 2.0678 0.0005 0.0121 0.4410
PI 504 0.0041 0.0032 0.0011 0.0033 0.0086
PIN 504 0.1964 0.0654 0.1241 0.1901 0.2738
VPIN 504 0.2109 0.1270 0.0724 0.1828 0.3771
ASY 504 0.0000 1.7739 −1.9124 −0.3586 2.2461
Panel B: Control variables
Size 504 13.4755 1.9578 11.3499 13.4890 16.1361
Turnover 504 −6.2710 1.1701 −7.7305 −6.3064 −4.9993
Volat 504 1.9493 0.9324 1.0627 1.7105 3.2050
Lev 504 0.6291 0.2340 0.3521 0.06395 0.8244
Prof 504 0.0324 0.0880 −0.0068 0.0384 0.0939
BTM 504 0.6413 0.7581 0.2187 0.5802 1.2897
Own 504 0.4715 0.2329 0.1510 0.4659 0.7602
Analys 504 8.8294 7.5414 1 7 19
Panel C: Dichotomous variable
#obs. 0 % 1 %
IFRS 504 252 50 252 50
Ibex 504 351 69.64 153 30.36
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics on the variables of the present analysis. Panel A corresponds to information asymmetry metrics.
QSPD is the relative quote bid-ask spread. AMH is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002). PI is the price impact measure proposed by
Huang and Stoll (1996). PIN is Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et al. (1996) model. VPIN is Volume-synchronised
Probability of Informed Trading developed in Easley et al. (2012). ASY is the composite index of information asymmetry based on the
before market microstructure measures: QSPD, AMH, PI, PIN, and VPIN. Panel B contains control variables: Size is the natural logarithm of
sales. Turnover is the natural logarithm of the average daily trading volume in € scaled by market value of the firm’s equity at the end of
the year. Volat is the standard deviation of daily returns. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Prof is the return on assets. BTM is
the book-to- market ratio. Own is the proportion of common shares held by the largest five shareholders. Analys is the total number of
analysts following a firm. Panel C reports the frequency dummy variables. IFRS takes the value 1 for the post-adoption period and 0 for
the pre-adoption period. Ibex is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm’s stocks are constituents of the IBEX-35 and 0 otherwise.
characteristics, such as financial leverage, return on as-
sets and growth options, because it is expected that firms
withmore financing needs, that are more profitable, and
with more growth opportunities will have more incen-
tives to be transparent and to disclose more information
(e.g. Daske et al. 2013). Lev is the ratio of total debt
to total assets, Prof is the return on assets, and BTM
is the book-to-market ratio. We also include variables
demonstrated by the prior literature to be associated
with the quantity and quality of information dissemi-
nated by/about the firm and with its information envi-
ronment, such as ownership concentration, financial an-
alyst coverage and inclusion in a stockmarket index (e.g.
Leuz 2003).Ahigher concentratedownership is expected
to be positively associated with information asymmetry
because shareholders with large blocks are likely to have
access to more private information about the firm. We
use Own as a proxy for ownership concentration, which
is the percentage of common shares held by the largest
five shareholders of the company. Prior research also
suggests that analyst coverage reduces the level of infor-
mation asymmetry among market participants because
the more analysts that follow a firm, the more infor-
mation is gathered by intermediaries and investors and,
therefore, the better the information environment of the
firm.We include in ourmodel the variableAnalys, which
represents the total number of analysts following a firm.
Moreover, those firms with shares that are constituents
of a stock market index are monitored with greater in-
tensity by investors andmarket agents, thereby positively
affecting the information environment of the firm. We
include Ibex, which is a dummy variable taking the value
of 1 if the company’s share is a constituent of the IBEX-
35,8 and zero otherwise. Finally, we control for industry
effects by including industry dummy variables, and for
temporary effects using robust standard errors clustered
by time and firm (Petersen 2009).
Sample and data
The sample is made up of stocks traded on the elec-
tronic trading platform of the Spanish Stock Exchange,
known as the SIBE (Sistema de Interconexio´n Bursa´til
Espan˜ol). The SIBE is an order-driven market where liq-
uidity is provided by a limit order book. Trading is con-
tinuous from9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. There are two regular
call auctions each day: the first determines the opening
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Table 3 Comparison between pre and post adoption period
Pre-adoption Post-adoption Difference
#obs. Mean SD #obs. Mean SD Mean t-stat z-Wil
QSPD 63 0.008 0.006 63 0.006 0.007 −0.002 −6.14∗∗∗ −5.50∗∗∗
AMH 63 0.572 2.218 63 0.137 0.492 −0.435 −1.72∗ −4.98∗∗∗
PI 63 0.004 0.003 63 0.004 0.003 −0.000 −1.49 −2.26∗∗
PIN 63 0.210 0.067 63 0.183 0.051 −0.027 −5.45∗∗∗ −4.93∗∗∗
VPIN 63 0.252 0.127 63 0.170 0.093 −0.081 −10.15∗∗∗ −6.83∗∗∗
ASY 63 0.376 1.781 63 −0.376 1.441 −0.753 −7.99∗∗∗ −6.21∗∗∗
Size 63 13.216 2.032 63 13.735 1.814 0.520 5.14∗∗∗ 6.44∗∗∗
Turnover 63 −6.537 0.996 63 −6.005 1.097 0.531 7.19∗∗∗ 5.70∗∗∗
Volat 63 1.836 0.743 63 2.063 0.671 0.227 3.33∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗
Lev 63 0.607 0.174 63 0.651 0.194 0.044 2.01∗∗ 2.13∗∗
Prof 63 0.031 0.060 63 0.034 0.070 0.003 0.37 0.17
BTM 63 0.721 0.415 63 0.562 0.517 −0.159 −2.24∗∗ −2.69∗∗∗
Own 63 0.438 0.224 63 0.505 0.213 0.067 3.62∗∗∗ 3.95∗∗∗
Analys 63 7.381 5.345 63 10.278 8.127 2.897 4.95∗∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of variables before and after IFRS adoption. The value of the difference before and after
the adoption is also reported. QSPD is the relative quote bid-ask spread; AMH is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002). PI is the price
impact measure proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996). PIN is Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et al. (1996) model.
VPIN is Volume-synchronised Probability of Informed Trading developed in Easley et al. (2012). ASY is the composite index of information
asymmetry based on the before market microstructure measures: QSPD, AMH, PI, PIN, and VPIN. Size is the natural logarithm of sales.
Turnover is the natural logarithm of the average daily trading volume in € scaled by market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the
year. Volat is the standard deviation of daily returns. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Prof is the return on assets. BTM is the
book-to-market ratio. Own is the proportion of common shares held by the largest five shareholders. Analys is the total number of analysts
following a firm. Ibex is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm’s stocks are constituents of the IBEX-35 and 0 otherwise. The t-test and
Wilcoxon z statistic (z-Wil) are used to test the null hypothesis of no significant differences in each measure between two periods.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively
price (8:30–9:00 a.m.), while the second sets the official
closing price (5:30–5:35 p.m.). Traders can submit three
basic types of orders: limit orders, market orders, and
market-to-limit orders. When the market is open in
continuous session, a trade occurs whenever an incom-
ing order hits the quotes on the other side of the order
book. Non-executed orders remain in the order book
using a price–time priority rule. Unexecuted orders can
be altered or cancelled at any time. Continuous trading
can be temporally interrupted since a system of stock-
specific intradayprice limits and short-lived call auctions
is implemented to handle unusual volatility levels. In all
auctions (open, close and volatility) orders can be sub-
mitted, modified or cancelled, but no trades occur.
Trade and quote data for this study come from SM
data files provided by the Sociedad de Bolsas, S.A. SM
files comprise detailed time-stamped information about
the first level of the limit order book for each stock
listed on the SIBE. Any trade, order submission and
cancellation affecting best prices in the book generates
a new record. The distinction between buyer-initiated
and seller-initiated trades is straightforward, without the
need to use a classification algorithm. Firms’ financial
statements data were obtained from the SABI database,
compiled by Bureau Van Dijk, and ownership concen-
tration and analysts’ data were collected from Thomson
Reuters Eikon Datastream files.
Our initial sample consists of all the non-financial
firms listed continuously on the main segment of the
SIBE during the period January 2001 to December 2008.
We choose this sample period to get a balanced set of
four years before (from 2001 to 2004) versus after (from
2005 to 2008) mandatory IFRS adoption. Within our
sample period, 64 non-financial firms are traded during
all the years, but we have not been able to collect market
microstructure data for one of them. Hence, the final
sample consists of a balanced panel of 63 firms and 504
firm-year observations, 252 observations for the period
2001–2004 and 252 for the period 2005–2008. On av-
erage, stocks included in our sample represent around
72% of the market capitalization and 82% of the trading
volume of the Spanish non-financial firms listed on the
SIBE within our sample period.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the study
variables for the full period (2001–2008): mean,median,
standard deviation, 10th percentile and 90th percentile
for the continuous variables (Panels A and B) and fre-
quency for dichotomous variables (Panel C). The mean
(median) of QSPD is 0.72% (0.46%). With regard to
AMH, its mean in our sample (0.35) is similar to that
reported by Amihud (2002). The average (median) of
price impact measure (PI) is 0.41% (0.33%). Consistent
C© 2016 CPA Australia Australian Accounting Review 9
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Table 4 Information asymmetry effects of IFRS adoption, pre-adoption period 2001–2004, post-adoption period 2005–2008
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
QDSP AMH PI PIN VPIN ASY
IFRS −0.209∗∗∗ −0.566∗∗∗ −0.041 −0.059∗ −0.238∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(−3.74) (−3.80) (−0.93) (−1.75) (−3.47) (3.67)
Size −0.163∗∗∗ −0.648∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗
(−3.59) (−6.10) (−2.60) (−3.39) (−4.25) (−3.81)
Turnover −0.287∗∗∗ −1.050∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗
(−8.10) (−10.88) (−6.20) (−4.01) (−8.82) (−7.99)
Volat 0.336∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.065∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(6.61) (7.55) (9.66) (0.76) (−2.88) (5.58)
Lev 0.483∗∗ 1.547∗∗∗ 0.308∗ −0.026 0.154 0.215
(2.17) (3.56) (1.83) (−0.28) (1.32) (1.54)
Prof −0.634 −0.374 −0.359 −0.182 −0.458 −0.570
(−0.88) (−0.28) (−0.65) (−0.75) (−1.36) (−1.22)
BTM 0.193∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.012 0.046 0.086∗∗
(3.12) (3.61) (2.67) (0.47) (1.29) (2.23)
Own −0.039 0.723∗ 0.004 0.228∗∗∗ 0.170 0.146
(−0.20) (1.91) (0.02) (2.68) (1.40) (1.21)
Analys −0.016∗∗ −0.028∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(−2.33) (−1.93) (−2.57) (−3.54) (−2.45) (−3.02)
Ibex −0.582∗∗∗ −1.223∗∗∗ −0.545∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.428∗∗∗ −0.354∗∗∗
(−6.25) (−4.93) (−7.92) (−2.69) (−7.22) (−7.19)
Intercept −5.733∗∗∗ −4.501∗∗∗ −6.234∗∗∗ −1.438∗∗∗ −1.337∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗
(−9.81) (−3.00) (−12.02) (−5.87) (−4.01) (2.58)
Indus. dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.815 0.879 0.825 0.641 0.838 0.830
#obs. 504 504 504 504 504 504
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficients of the regression model (9) for the full period (from 2001 to 2008). QSPD is the relative quote
bid-ask spread; AMH is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002). PI is the price impact measure proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996). PIN
is Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et al. (1996) model. VPIN is Volume-synchronised Probability of Informed Trading
developed in Easley et al. (2012). ASY is the composite index of information asymmetry based on the before market microstructure
measures: QSPD, AMH, PI, PIN, and VPIN. All microstructure measures are included in natural logarithms. IFRS is a dummy that takes the
value 1 for the post-adoption period (2005–2008) and 0 for the pre-adoption period (2001–2004). Size is the natural logarithm of sales.
Turnover is the natural logarithm of the average daily trading volume in € scaled by market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the
year. Volat is the standard deviation of daily returns. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Prof is the return on assets. BTM is the
book-to-market ratio. Own is the proportion of common shares held by the largest five shareholders. Analys is the total number of analysts
following a firm. Ibex is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm’s stocks are constituents of the IBEX-35 and 0 otherwise. Robust t
statistics clustered at the firm-year level in brackets.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
withAbad andYagu¨e (2012), thePIN and theVPIN show
similar mean values, around 20% and 21%, respectively.
PIN values are also consistent with those reported in
other studies using this information asymmetry proxy
(e.g. Easley et al. 2002; Brown and Hillegeist 2007). The
mean of ASY is zero (by construction) and its median
is –0.36. The statistical distributions of the above vari-
ables show that there are clear differences in the degree
of asymmetric information among the firms in our sam-
ple. The control variables also show a significant level of
dispersion in their values, reflecting the heterogeneity of
our firm-year sample.
Table 2 provides the Pearson correlation matrix be-
tween the variables used in the study. All the information
asymmetry proxies are positively correlated with each
other, which indicates that these measures are likely to
be driven by adverse selection, but each contains unique
information. Moreover, the index is positively and
significantly correlated with each information asymme-
try variable, ranging from a correlation of 91% between
ASY andQSPD to a correlation of 49% betweenASY and
AMH. Moreover, correlations between the index and the
five proxies for information asymmetry are generally
higher than correlations between the five proxies. This
suggests that the index is a parsimonious way of measur-
ing information asymmetry. The correlations between
information asymmetry proxies and control variables
are quite significant.
Univariate analysis
We begin our analysis with univariate comparisons of
themeasures of information asymmetry before and after
IFRS adoption. In Table 3 we report summary statistics
of our variables for bothperiods, the difference ofmeans,
10 Australian Accounting Review C© 2016 CPA Australia
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Table 5 Information asymmetry effects of IFRS adoption, pre-adoption period 2001–2003, post-adoption period 2005–2008
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
QDSP AMH PI PIN VPIN ASY
IFRS −0.235∗∗∗ −0.667∗∗∗ −0.065 −0.079∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗
(−3.49) (−4.77) (−1.32) (−2.43) (−3.74) (−4.06)
Size −0.167∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(−3.69) (−6.05) (−2.58) (−3.47) (−4.30) (−3.93)
Turnover −0.285∗∗∗ −1.025∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗
(−7.65) (−11.54) (−5.63) (−3.84) (−7.86) (−8.12)
Volat 0.306∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.078∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(5.82) (7.71) (9.47) (0.34) (−4.27) (6.88)
Lev 0.528∗∗ 1.521∗∗∗ 0.340∗ −0.033 0.147 0.230
(2.20) (3.33) (1.87) (−0.35) (1.11) (1.53)
Prof −0.611 −0.438 −0.372 −0.206 −0.479 −0.575
(−0.86) (−0.34) (−0.68) (−0.89) (−1.43) (−1.25)
BTM 0.196∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.007 0.039 0.085∗∗
(3.33) (3.72) (2.85) (0.28) (1.08) (2.31)
Own 0.003 0.762 0.015 0.226∗∗∗ 0.165 0.153
(0.02) (1.91) (0.09) (2.60) (1.21) (1.17)
Analys −0.016∗∗ −0.026∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(−2.28) (−1.78) (−2.48) (−3.47) (−2.38) (−2.92)
Ibex −0.583∗∗∗ −1.265∗∗∗ −0.554∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.419∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗
(−6.21) (−4.95) (−8.00) (−2.83) (−6.48) (−7.76)
Intercept −5.636∗∗∗ −4.198∗∗∗ −6.134∗∗∗ −1.386∗∗∗ −1.209∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗
(−9.83) (−2.84) (−11.70) (−6.14) (−3.71) (3.08)
Indus. dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.814 0.878 0.819 0.648 0.839 0.833
#obs. 441 441 441 441 441 441
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficients of the regression model (9) for the full period, excluding 2004. QSPD is the relative quote
bid-ask spread; AMH is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002). PI is the price impact measure proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996). PIN
is Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et al. (1996) model. VPIN is Volume-synchronised Probability of Informed Trading
developed in Easley et al. (2012). ASY is the composite index of information asymmetry based on the before market microstructure
measures: QSPD, AMH, PI, PIN, and VPIN. All microstructure measures are included in natural logarithms. IFRS is a dummy that takes the
value of 1 for the post-adoption period (2005–2008) and 0 for the pre-adoption period (2001–2003). Size is the natural logarithm of
sales. Turnover is the natural logarithm of the average daily trading volume in € scaled by market value of the firm’s equity at the end
of the year. Volat is the standard deviation of daily returns. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Prof is the return on assets. BTM
is the book-to-market ratio. Own is the proportion of common shares held by the largest five shareholders. Analys is the total number
of analysts following a firm. Ibex is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm’s stocks are constituents of the IBEX-35 and 0 otherwise.
Robust t statistics clustered at the firm-year level in brackets.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
and thepaired t-test andWilcoxon test (z-statistic) values
to check the null hypothesis of no significant differences
between both periods.
Focusing on information asymmetry, we observe a re-
duction after IFRS adoption for all proxies estimated,
which is significant at conventional levels using both
parametric and non-parametric tests (with the only ex-
ception being PI in the case of the t-test). This finding
is consistent with the hypothesis that the higher disclo-
sure and information comparability enhanced by IFRS
implementation is associated with a reduction in infor-
mation asymmetry, even in a country where the level
of enforcement is not high. Regarding the changes in
our control variables, we find increases in almost all
of them according to the parametrical t-test and non-
parametrical test of Wilcoxon at the 1% significance
level (except in leverage, significant at the 5% level).
In BTM, inverse of growth opportunities, we show a re-
duction after IFRS, consistent with an increase in growth
options, at the 5% (1%) significance level for t-test (z-
test).Only forProfdowenotfindevidenceof a significant
change.
Multivariate regression
Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate regres-
sion analyses for Eq. (9) for the different information
asymmetry proxies (QSPD, AMH, PI, PIN, VPIN and
ASY) used as dependent variables. We report the coeffi-
cients and t-statistics based on standard errors double-
clustered by firm and year (Petersen 2009), which are
robust to both heteroscedasticity and within firm serial
correlation.
Our results show that the coefficient on IFRS is
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in
four out of our six measures and at the 10% level in one
of them. These findings give evidence of a reduction of
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Table 6 Information asymmetry effects of IFRS adoption, pre-adoption period 2001–2004, post-adoption period 2006–2008
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
QDSP AMH PI PIN VPIN ASY
IFRS −0.180∗∗∗ −0.604∗∗∗ −0.022 −0.074∗ −0.304∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(−2.61) (−3.35) (−0.041) (−1.95) (−4.81) (−3.23)
Size −0.165∗∗∗ −0.639∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(−3.53) (−5.85) (−2.53) (−3.34) (−3.91) (−3.71)
Turnover −0.289∗∗∗ −1.034∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗
(−9.23) (−10.91) (−7.05) (−4.95) (−10.69) (−8.67)
Volat 0.317∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0351∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.057∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(6.48) (6.67) (9.07) (0.65) (−2.21) (4.82)
Lev 0.520∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗ 0.308∗ −0.017 0.189∗ 0.240∗
(2.33) (3.72) (1.74) (−0.19) (1.68) (1.74)
Prof −0.664 −0.357 −0.320 −0.236 −0.454 −0.597
(−0.91) (−0.28) (−0.56) (−0.98) (−1.40) (−1.23)
BTM 0.194∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.013 0.050 0.088∗∗
(3.18) (3.63) (2.55) (0.54) (1.53) (2.36)
Own −0.054 0.765∗ −0.012 0.248∗∗∗ 0.219∗ 0.159
(−0.26) (1.95) (−0.08) (3.13) (1.92) (1.31)
Analys −0.162∗∗ −0.026∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(−2.24) (−1.80) (−2.45) (−3.13) (−2.16) (−2.71)
Ibex −0.567∗∗∗ −1.288∗∗∗ −0.554∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗ −0.453∗∗∗ −0.357∗∗∗
(−6.12) (−5.23) (−8.40) (−2.32) (−7.53) (−7.18)
Intercept −5.713∗∗∗ −4.533∗∗∗ −6.233∗∗∗ −1.493∗∗∗ −1.391∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗
(−9.80) (−2.88) (−12.02) (−6.21) (−3.90) (2.41)
Indus. dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.808 0.876 0.820 0.638 0.846 0.824
#obs. 441 441 441 441 441 441
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficients of the regression model (9) for the full period, excluding 2005. QSPD is the relative quote
bid-ask spread; AMH is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002). PI is the price impact measure proposed by Huang and Stoll (1996). PIN
is Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et al. (1996) model. VPIN is Volume-synchronised Probability of Informed Trading
developed in Easley et al. (2012). ASY is the composite index of information asymmetry based on the before market microstructure
measures: QSPD, AMH, PI, PIN, and VPIN. All microstructure measures are included in natural logarithms. IFRS is a dummy that takes the
value 1 for the post-adoption period (2006–2008) and 0 for the pre-adoption period (2001–2004). Size is the natural logarithm of sales.
Turnover is the natural logarithm of the average daily trading volume in € scaled by market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the
year. Volat is the standard deviation of daily returns. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Prof is the return on assets. BTM is the
book-to-market ratio. Own is the proportion of common shares held by the largest five shareholders. Analys is the total number of analysts
following a firm. Ibex is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm’s stocks are constituents of the IBEX-35 and 0 otherwise. Robust t
statistics clustered at the firm-year level in brackets.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
information asymmetry after IFRS adoption. We find a
decrease of the bid-ask spread, illiquidity, PIN andVPIN
after IFRS, while we do not find a significant effect on PI.
In the last column, we confirm that there is a reduction
of information asymmetry after IFRS, measured by the
composite index that includes all thepriorproxies (ASY).
This finding is consistent with previous research that, on
average, has found capital market benefits after the im-
plementationof thenewaccounting standards.However,
we find these post-IFRS benefits in terms of liquidity and
adverse selection in a country where legal enforcement
is weak, whereas previous studies with international
samples findmarket capital benefits mostly in the aggre-
gate of countries with strong enforcement systems (e.g.
Daske et al. 2008; Li 2010). We also add to the previous
literature the benefits of IFRS for adverse selection,
measured by PIN and VPIN, not examined in previous
literature. Our findings are consistent with previous
research in Spain, which has found that IFRS disclosures
to adjust SAS are priced by the market (Aledo et al.
2014).
All the coefficients of the control variables of mar-
ket microstructure (firm size, turnover and volatility)
present the expected signs according to the literature
and are statistically significant at the 1% level. We find
that more traded and larger firms show less information
asymmetry, whereas firms with more volatile stock re-
turns are associatedwith higher information asymmetry.
Besides, we also find that both higher analyst following
and the inclusion in the index IBEX-35 are associated
with lower information asymmetry.
Overall, in a country with significant differences be-
tween the previous local GAAP and IFRS and a low
enforcement level, our findings show that, after control-
ling formarket determinants of adverse selection and the
information environment of the firms, IFRS adoption is
12 Australian Accounting Review C© 2016 CPA Australia
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Table 7 Information asymmetry effects of IFRS adoption pre-adoption period, 2001–2003, post-adoption period 2006–2008
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
QDSP AMH PI PIN VPIN ASY
IFRS −0.200∗∗ −0.702∗∗∗ −0.041 −0.091∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗
(−2.36) (−3.84) (−0.69) (−2.54) (−4.85) (−3.19)
Size −0.169∗∗∗ −0.633∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗
(−3.62) (−5.77) (−2.48) (−3.41) (−3.89) (−3.79)
Turnover −0.290∗∗∗ −1.004∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗
(−9.23) (−11.70) (−6.58) (−5.02) (−9.16) (−9.02)
Volat 0.280∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.073∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(6.34) (7.03) (9.68) (0.10) (−3.44) (7.38)
Lev 0.574∗∗ 1.507∗∗∗ 0.342∗ −0.025 0.183 0.258∗
(2.35) (3.45) (1.76) (−0.28) (1.40) (1.72)
Prof −0.676 −0.463 −0.350 −0.279 −0.483 −0.619
(−0.96) (−0.38) (−0.63) (−1.28) (−1.51) (−1.32)
BTM 0.199∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.008 0.044 0.088∗∗
(3.39) (3.78) (2.67) (0.33) (1.29) (2.44)
Own −0.012 0.811∗ −0.004 0.247∗∗∗ 0.218 0.166
(−0.06) (1.92) (−0.02) (3.05) (1.62) (1.23)
Analys −0.016∗∗ −0.024∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(−2.18) (−1.65) (−2.37) (−2.95) (−2.06) (−2.59)
Ibex −0.559∗∗∗ −1.336∗∗∗ −0.563∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗ −0.433∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗
(−6.03) (−5.18) (−8.28) (−2.41) (−6.59) (−7.85)
Intercept −5.625∗∗∗ −4.216∗∗∗ −6.130∗∗∗ −1.448∗∗∗ −1.257∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗
(−9.96) (−2.72) (−11.73) (−6.63) (−3.51) (2.86)
Indus. dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.807 0.875 0.813 0.647 0.846 0.826
#obs. 378 378 378 378 378 378
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficients of the regression model (9) for the full period, excluding 2004 and 2005. QSPD is the relative
quote bid-ask spread; AMH is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002). PI is the price impact measure proposed by Huang and Stoll
(1996). PIN is Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et al. (1996) model. VPIN is Volume-synchronised Probability of Informed
Trading developed in Easley et al. (2012). ASY is the composite index of information asymmetry based on the before market microstructure
measures: QSPD, AMH, PI, PIN, and VPIN. All microstructure measures are included in natural logarithms. IFRS is a dummy that takes the
value 1 for the post-adoption period (2006–2008) and 0 for the pre-adoption period (2001–2003). Size is the natural logarithm of sales.
Turnover is the natural logarithm of the average daily trading volume in € scaled by market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the
year. Volat is the standard deviation of daily returns. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Prof is the return on assets. BTM is the
book-to-market ratio. Own is the proportion of common shares held by the largest five shareholders. Analys is the total number of analysts
following a firm. Ibex is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm’s stocks are constituents of the IBEX-35 and 0 otherwise. Robust t
statistics clustered at the firm-year level in brackets.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
associated with a reduction in the level of information
asymmetry in the stock market. Thus, our findings sup-
port Barth and Israeli’s (2013) point of view that IFRS
adoption itself can confer capital-market benefits.
Sensitivity analyses
Alternative year periods of analysis
To assess the robustness of our results, we examine alter-
native periods tomitigate concerns that the findingsmay
differ depending on the pre–post IFRS periods selected.
First, like other listed firms within the European Union,
Spanishfirmsweremandatorily required toprepare their
financial statements from 1 January 2005. However, the
IFRS adoption was preceded by a long introduction pro-
cess and any firm could pre-empt the introduction of
IFRS. For this reason, we drop 2004 from our origi-
nal sample period and repeat all analyses. The results,
reported in Table 5, are robust to excluding this year.
We again find for five out of our six proxies of infor-
mation asymmetry a negative and significant effect of
IFRS.
Furthermore, to avoid any potential impact that the
first year of IFRS adoption may have on our results,
for example, firms could disclose greater levels of in-
formation or be subject to higher control by investors
and regulators, as suggested by Brochet et al. (2013,
p. 1394), we exclude 2005 from the original analysis pe-
riod. Table 6 reports the results once effects that may be
attributable to the transition year are eliminated, and we
find the results are similar to those reported above. We
obtain the same results after dropping simultaneously
the last year before and the first year of the manda-
tory IFRS adoption (2004–2005) to avoid the effects of
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Table 8 Firm-month analysis of information asymmetry effects around IFRS adoption
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
QDSP AMH PI PIN VPIN ASY
IFRS −0.102∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ 0.032 0.015 −0.136∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗
(−2.26) (−2.76) (0.99) (0.54) (−3.30) (−2.15)
Size −0.110∗∗∗ −0.430∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.031 −0.036 −0.046∗∗
(−2.72) (−3.31) (−2.56) (−1.55) (−1.28) (−2.22)
Turnover −0.249∗∗∗ −0.950∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
(−7.78) (−11.28) (−3.34) (−2.68) (−3.63) (−4.89)
Volat 0.225∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.047∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(5.24) (4.57) (5.75) (6.36) (1.79) (5.94)
Lev 0.047 0.534 −0.009 −0.107 −0.296∗∗ −0.066
(0.18) (0.86) (−0.04) (−0.65) (−2.21) (−0.51)
Prof −1.956∗∗ −1.008 −1.307∗∗∗ −0.063 0.088 −0.747∗∗
(−2.56) (−0.56) (−2.74) (−0.21) (0.31) (−2.20)
BTM 0.209∗∗ 0.588∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.059 0.063 0.101∗
(2.02) (2.17) (2.05) (1.12) (1.00) (1.86)
Own −0.139 0.572 0.089 0.244∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.094
(−0.64) (1.34) (0.58) (2.15) (3.99) (1.01)
Analys −0.026∗∗ −0.063∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.010∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.013∗∗
(−2.42) (−2.33) (−2.52) (−1.91) (−2.02) (−2.47)
Ibex −0.620∗∗∗ −1.001∗∗∗ −0.483∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ −0.423∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗
(−5.21) (−3.64) (−5.35) (−2.75) (−6.33) (−5.19)
Intercept −5.792∗∗∗ −6.344∗∗∗ −6.117∗∗∗ −1.820∗∗∗ −1.886∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗
(−11.22) (−4.36) (−16.35) (−6.69) (−5.00) (2.76)
Indus. dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.800 0.876 0.742 0.305 0.603 0.745
#obs. 1884 1882 1882 1857 1882 1856
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficients of the regression model (9) for fifteen months before and after IFRS adoption. QSPD is the
relative quote bid-ask spread; AMH is the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002). PI is the price impact measure proposed by Huang and Stoll
(1996). PIN is Probability of Informed Trading based on the Easley et al. (1996) model. VPIN is Volume-synchronised Probability of Informed
Trading developed in Easley et al. (2012). ASY is the composite index of information asymmetry based on the before market microstructure
measures: QSPD, PI, PIN, and VPIN. All microstructure measures are included in natural logarithms. IFRS is a dummy that takes the value 1
for the post-adoption period and 0 for the pre-adoption period. Size is the natural logarithm of sales. Turnover is the natural logarithm of
the average daily trading volume in € scaled by market value of the firm’s equity at the end of the month. Volat is the monthly standard
deviation of daily returns. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Prof is the return on assets. BTM is the book-to-market ratio. Own
is the proportion of common shares held by the largest five shareholders. Analys is the total number of analysts following a firm. Ibex is
a dummy that takes the value 1 the firm’s stocks are constituents of the IBEX-35 and 0 otherwise. Robust t statistics clustered at the firm
and month-year levels in brackets.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
this transaction period to IFRS (see Table 7). We also
repeat the analyses removing those years farthest from
the year of IFRS adoption to minimise the potential ef-
fects of the financial crisis: 2002–2004 vs. 2005–2007;
2002–2004 vs. 2006–2007; 2002–2003 vs. 2006–2007. All
the results (not tabulated) are robust. Finally, although
in our regression estimations we control for temporal
effects, to check once more that the improvements in
information asymmetry observed after IFRS adoption
are not a function of time we analyse changes in our
information asymmetry measures in the years of the
pre-IFRS period (e.g. 2003 vs. 2004). The (untabulated)
results show that there are no improvements in infor-
mation asymmetry prior to IFRS adoption. Therefore,
all our findings suggest that the IFRS adoption is signifi-
cantly associated with lower levels of information asym-
metry and that it is not due to an improvement through
time.
Firm-month analyses around mandatory IFRS
adoption
In addition to the prior firm-year analyses, we collect
monthly data for our information asymmetry prox-
ies and repeat the same analyses around the time of
IFRS adoption taking into account the early release of
IFRS information through interim reports. Thus, we
explicitly assess the sensitivity of our findings using an-
other data frequency. We analyse a window of –15 and
+15months around thefirst interimreport preparedun-
der IFRS (March 2005), so it includesmonthly data from
January 2004 to June 2006 (Table 8). Focusing on this
shorter time period around mandatory IFRS adoption,
asDaske et al. (2008)point out,we couldbe capturing the
effects of the relevant accounting change per se with less
likelihood of capturing the effects of other institutional
changes (e.g, in the governance or enforcement regimes).
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Table 9 Information asymmetry effects of IFRS adoption by firm size and ownership concentration
Panel A: Partition by firm size Panel B: Partition by ownership concentration
Small Large Diff. Low concentred High concentred Diff.
IFRS −0.115∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗ 0.009 −0.082∗∗ −0.154∗∗ 0.072∗∗
(−5.27) (−2.06) (−2.03) (−2.45)
Size −0.078∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗
(−2.46) (−14.10) (−3.57) (−4.60)
Turnover −0.177∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗
(−7.52) (−5.09) (−6.12) (−6.88)
Volat 0.139∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(4.92) (2.93) (7.14) (3.51)
Lev 0.297∗ −0.141 0.370∗∗ −0.173
(1.86) (−0.97) (2.09) (−0.94)
Prof −0.253 −1.830∗∗∗ −0.321 −1.116
(−0.65) (−3.33) (−0.63) (1.60)
BTM 0.092∗∗ 0.097 0.109∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(2.39) (1.27) (2.21) (2.91)
Own 0.178 0.128 0.665∗∗∗ 0.221
(0.97) (1.05) (2.57) (1.59)
Analys −0.014 −0.011∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗
(−1.19) (−2.33) (−2.93) (−2.19)
Ibex −0.567∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ −0.496∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗
(−6.75) (−4.18) (−7.13) (−3.64)
Intercept 0.687∗ 1.980∗∗∗ 0.415 1.604∗∗∗
(1.84) (5.36) (1.18) (3.26)
Indus. dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.546 0.884 0.855 0.857
#obs. 252 252 252 252
Notes: This table reports OLS coefficients of the regression model (9) for the full period by using as dependent variable ASY, which is
the composite index of information asymmetry based on the market microstructure measures: QSPD, AMH, PI, PIN, and VPIN. IFRS is a
dummy that takes the value 1 for the post-adoption period (2005–2008) and 0 for the pre-adoption period (2001–2004). Size is the
natural logarithm of sales. Turnover is the natural logarithm of the average daily trading volume in € scaled by market value of the firm’s
equity at the end of the year. Volat is the standard deviation of daily returns. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Prof is the return
on assets. BTM is the book-to-market ratio. Own is the proportion of common shares held by the largest five shareholders. Analys is the
total number of analysts following a firm. Ibex is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm’s stocks are constituents of the IBEX-35 and 0
otherwise. Robust t statistics clustered at the firm-year level in brackets.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance levels at two-tail tests of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
As shown in Table 8, in four out of our six proxies of in-
formation asymmetry, there is a negative and significant
effect of IFRS, suggesting that IFRS adoption is signifi-
cantly associated with lower levels of information asym-
metry. Our results (not tabulated) are also robust if we
exclude the year 2005 in the analysis and thus analyse the
period from October 2003 (–15) to March 2007 (+15).
Analyses of the effects of IFRS adoption
for heterogeneous firms
We provide additional evidence of the IFRS effects for
firms characterised by different information environ-
ments. Since extensive research suggests that both firm
size and ownership concentration proxy for the quantity
and quality of information available about a firm, we
divide our sample firms into big versus small firms and
into thosewith high versus low ownership concentration
according to themedian values. Thus, we further investi-
gatewhether the effects of IFRS adoptionon information
asymmetry are different depending on the firm’s infor-
mation environment. Table 9 reports the results for the
two firm partitions by size (Panel A) and by ownership
concentration (Panel B), obtained using the composite
index of asymmetric information (ASY) and the firm-
year panel data of our sample period. As seen in Panel A,
the coefficient on IFRS is significantly negative for both
small and large firms presenting very similar values in
both cases (coefficients equal to –0.115 and –0.124, re-
spectively). Focusing on the effects of IFRS depending
on the firm’s corporate governance environment, which
we proxy for ownership concentration, as Panel B shows,
the coefficient on IFRS is also negative and significantly
negative different from zero for both those firms with
low concentrated (coefficient = –0.082, t-statistic =
–2.03) and high concentrated ownership (coefficient =
–0.154, t-statistic = –2.45), however, it seems that the
effect is stronger for more concentrated firms (the dif-
ference between coefficients on IFRS of both two firms’
groups is statistically significant at the 5% level). This
finding could suggest that IFRS adoption has implied
C© 2016 CPA Australia Australian Accounting Review 15
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a reduction of information asymmetries in those firms
that are less proactive in disclosing information, thus ad-
vocating the benefits of IFRS and the argument that the
benefits produced could be due to the higher disclosure
requirements of IFRS.
Conclusions
This study examines the consequences of IFRS regard-
ing information asymmetry in Spain, a country with
significant differences between local GAAP and IFRS
and low levels of enforcement.We use individual proxies
for information asymmetry developed by market mi-
crostructure literature (i.e. relative quoted spread, illiq-
uidity measure, price impact, PIN, and VPIN) and an
adverse selection index combining all of them, which
allows us to assess in a precise way the effect of IFRS
on the level of adverse selection among market partic-
ipants. Using annual and monthly data, we find a sig-
nificant reduction of information asymmetry associated
with mandatory IFRS adoption, which in a sensitivity
analysis we find is higher for those firms with higher
ownership concentration. Due to the Spanish features
mentioned above and since the enforcement level has not
substantially changed in this country after IFRS adop-
tion, our results support the view that IFRS per se convey
benefits to the market. Our findings are consistent with
the argument that IFRS adoption implies an increase in
financial reporting quality or disclosure and enhances
financial information comparability.
Our study contributes to the literature on the con-
sequences of IFRS adoption in the capital market and
to the debate regarding which sources bring about mar-
ket benefits after this adoption. Previous studies with
international samples have found market benefits as-
sociated with IFRS adoption in terms of liquidity and
cost of capital, particularly in countries with strong legal
enforcement and in firms that have more reporting in-
centives (Daske et al. 2008, 2013; Li 2010). By focusing
on a single country we avoid the heterogeneity of low
enforcement countries, showing that even in this type
of country IFRS adoption can be associated with posi-
tive economic consequences in themarket. Nevertheless,
we are cautious with regard to this argument, because,
although we have controlled for market and firm char-
acteristics and carried out several robustness tests, the
reduction in the level of information asymmetry ob-
served could be driven, besides the implementation of
the new standards, by other economic factors that may
have affected the firms’ information environment.
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Notes
1 See Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013) for a review.
2 In terms of market capitalisation and trading volume, the
Spanish Stock Exchange is one of the largest stock markets
for which IFRS was made mandatory in 2005 (see the 2006
WorldFederationofExchanges annual report: http://www.world-
exchanges.org/insight/reports/2006-wfe-annual-report).
3 Both bid-ask spread and illiquidity ratio are noisy proxies for
asymmetric information given that they commonly include other
components that are not related to information (inventory costs,
order processing cost, monopoly rents, etc.), but that also influ-
ence stock liquidity.
4 We only report the results using 30-minute price impact. The
results using 1- and 5-minute price impactd are quite similar
to those presented and they are available upon request from the
authors.
5 We thank one reviewer for the suggestion of adopting the
method of Gan et al. (2005) to set initial values. In the previous
version, we used Yan and Zhang’s (2012) procedure. Results
present neither quantitative nor qualitative variations, but we
have decided to use this method because it allows us to obtain
more available estimations.
6 Easley et al. (1997) indicate that a 30 trading-day window allows
sufficient trade observations for the PIN estimation procedure.
Akay et al. (2012) use 20 trading days to estimate PIN, finding
numerical solutions for all their estimations. Hence, the use
of one-month transaction data should be wide enough to
produce reliable estimates and also to allow us to obtain more
PIN estimations as a result of being confronted with fewer
computational problems.
7 In addition to estimating this index by employing the principal
components analysis, we also estimate an equally weighted
index from our information asymmetry measures. To do so,
we standardise the individual proxies and calculate the mean
of the five proxies. The results obtained with both indexes are
very similar. We do not report the results obtained by using the
equally weighted index, but they are available upon request from
the authors.
8 The IBEX-35 is the official index of the Spanish Stock Exchange,
composed of the 35 most liquid and active stocks listed on the
Spanish Stock Exchange.
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